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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover vested benefits 
accumulated in the account of plaintiff in a profit Shar-
ing and Retirement plan maintained by defendants. The 
defendant, p-M Engineers counterclaimed for breach of 
contract -
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary judgment was 
granted awarding plaintiff his vested accumulated benefits 
in the Profit Sharing and Retirement plan and dismissing 
defendants' counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
plaintiff seeks to have the Summary judgment of 
the Lower court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
BACKGROUND 
The defendant, p-M Engineers, inc., hereinafter 
referred to as the Company, was a corporation organized 
under the Laws of the State of Utah to provide Engineer-
ing Services (R 405). During the year 1958, a profit 
Sharing and Retirement plan, (hereinafter referred to 
as "The plan") was established by p-M Engineers, inc., 
for the benefit of the employees (R 71). The plan 
provided for an Administrative committee of 3 members, 
each of whom were appointed by the company. 
During 1974, the Administrative committee Members 
were defendants, Gail 0. Payne, Richard Klein and paul 
McGill, the president of p-M Engineers, inc.. in 
addition, the defendants were all employees and members 
of the Board of Directors of P-M Engineers and co-
participants with the plaintiff under the profit Sharing 
and Retirement Plan. 
From May of 1959, to January 7,1975, the plaintiff, 
James M. Burrows, was an employee of p-M Engineers, inc., 
a period of approximately 15 years, (R 141) . While an 
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employee, plaintiff was eligible and became a partici-
pant in the company's Plan (R 228). 
During 1974, the plaintiff workec^ for P-M Engineers, 
inc., as a job inspector at the Main post Office project 
hereinafter referred to as "M.P.O." (Deposition of Paul 
McGill as transcribed by R. Dean Sealy, p. 65, lines 5-6). 
VESTED ACCOUNT BALANCE 
As of December 31,1974, the plaintiff had accu-
mulated a gross balance of $25,183.06, in his plan 
Account with 85% vesting for a total of $21,405.60 
accumulated vested benefits due to the plaintiff upon 
his termination (R 345). 
TERMINATION OF JAME& BURROWS 
On December 26, 1974, james Burrows was called 
to the office of Paul McGill who told Burrows that he 
was terminated. 
james Burrows stated that he was told he was being 
terminated because he would not purchase stock in other 
P-M ventures and was therefore not a "team player." 
(Dep. james Burrows, p. 3 lines 19-24) 
Paul McGill stated he terminated james Burrows be-
cause he was removing material from thfe M.P.O. Site 
and charging unauthorized mileage and overtime. (Dep. 
P. McGill as transcribed by Sealy p. 7JL lines 4-17) 
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James Burrows, with the permission of the sub-
contractors, had removed scrap lumber from packing boxes, 
(Dep. Leon Carver p. 11, lines 12-25; P. 12, lines 1-4) 
left over scrap bricks, (Dep. Floyd Young, p. 8, lines 
22-25; p. 9, lines 1-9) and a power pole, (Dep. James 
Burrows p. 11, lines 11-18). 
The sub-contractors stated that it was costly to haul 
the scrap lumber and bricks to the garbage dump and they 
preferred to have site personnel remove the scrap material. 
(Dep. Phil Cleaves, p. 14, lines 20-25; p. 15, lines 1-7) 
(Dep. Leon Carver, p. 10, lines 5-16). For this reason, 
the masonry sub-contractor maintained a scrap brick dump. 
(Dep. Floyd Young, p. 9, lines 20-25) (Dep. Leon carver, 
P. 9, lines 16-25). The air-conditioning and heating 
sub-contractor allowed and encouraged the removal of the 
wooden packing crates provided the entire crate was re-
moved and no scrap material was left. (Dep. Leon carver, 
P. 11, lines 5-15). 
MILEAGE 
james Burrows was asked by the company to drive his 
car to the Salt Lake City Airport. He requested a mileage 
reimbursement. (p. 68, lines 2-4, Dep. Eugene Fortuna, 
Company controller). After he was terminated, an audit 
of his time cards was made by Eugene Fortuna, (Dep. Eugene 
Fortuna, p. 72, lines 11-13)_. 
Eugene Fortuna stated that the mileage reimbursement 
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requested by James Burrows for the use of his private 
car on official company business was nc^ t authorized by 
Paul McGill. (Dep. Eugene Fortuna, p. 62, lines 19-23) 
The policy in regards to the mileage and overtime 
was made by Paul McGill, (Dep. Eugene fortuna, p. 63, 
lines 3-6) and stated as follows: 
"Whenever he, (Paul McGill) told m^ (Eugene Fortuna) 
it was approved, it was approved, yhenever he told 
me it wasn't, it wasn't'1. (Dep. Eugene Fortuna, 
p. 63, lines 1-3) . 
OVERTIME 
james Burrows worked overtime at the offices of P-M 
Engineers where he plotted various curyes and graphs 
for the company. (Dep. Dan Schilaty, p. 27, lines 1-6) 
(Dep., Oscar Whitten, p. 19, lines 11-[L3). He applied 
for and received payment for the overtime. After the 
termination of james Burrows, it was determined by Paul 
McGill that the overtime paid was not authorized. (Dep. 
Eugene Fortuna p. 70, lines 1-20). 
There is no allegation by the defendants that the 
mileage was not incurred or the overtime submitted was 
not worked by the plaintiff, merely, tjhe mileage and the 
overtime should not have been approve^ by office personnel. 
EFFECTIVE TERMINATION DATE 
Paul McGill told the Administrative Committee of the 
termination of james Burrows on or abqut December 26th 1974, 
"perhaps that same day." (Dep. paul McGill, transcribed 
by Harmon, p. 5, lines 23-25; p. 6, lines 1-5) 
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The termination was effective as of January 7, 1975. 
(Dep. james Burrows, p. 31, lines 6-7) 
APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS 
Plaintiff made application for his benefits due 
under the plan. The Administrative committee met on 
February 21, 1975, and March 7, 1975, and discussed the 
issue of whether or not they should forfeit the plaintiff's 
vested benefits. (See minutes of Administrative committee 
Meetings, Ex. 4 & 5 attached to Dep. of Paul McGill as 
transcribed by Harmon) 
The committee determined that it did not have suffi-
cient information or grounds to forfeit the plaintiff's 
vested benefits and asked plaintiff to arbitrate the 
matter. (Ex. 4 attached to Dep. of p. McGill as transcribed 
by Harmon.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 
The plaintiff declined the offer to arbitrate the 
matter. The plaintiff made demand for payment of his 
vested account benefits and when no payment was made, 
the plaintiff commenced this legal action. 
DEFENDANT's ANSWER 
The defendants answered the plaintiff's complaint 
alleging a right to forfeit plaintiff's vested account 
benefits. (R 285-297) 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The plaintiff's complaint was originally filed with 
three other fellow employee plaintiffs who were denied 
their vested account benefits. The lower court separated 
the four (4) plaintiff's actions for tirial. 
The four (4) plaintiffs all filed potions for Summary 
judgment to be heard on the same day at the same time. 
One case was settled before the date of the hearing. 
Two cases WQre settled after oral argument had begun 
but before it was completed. 
The lower court took the remaining case under advise-
ment and rendered its decision awarding Summary judgment 
to the plaintiff and dismissing defendant p-M Engineers 
counter-claim. Defendants appealed frpm the decision of 
the lower court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UPON HIS TERMINATION WITH THE COMPANY THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF HIS VESTED 
BENEFITS UNLESS THE PLAN COMMITTEE TOOK AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION TO FORFEIT THOSE BENEFITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE TERMS OF THE PLAN AND HAVING FJAILED TO DO SO, 
CANNOT FORFEIT PLAINTIFF'S BENEFITS NOW. 
The provisions of the Plan relating to plaintiff's 
benefits are as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
PURPOSE OF THE TRU^T 
j 
"1. It is the purpose of this trust to recognize 
the contribution made to the successful operation of 
the Company by its various employees and to regard 
such contribution by establishing |a system of profit 
sharing for those employees who sijall hereafter 
qualify as participants under thist trust, and for 
the beneficiaries designated by sxjch employees. 
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2. This agreement has been executed for the exclusive 
benefit of the participants and their beneficiaries. 
So far as possible, this agreement should be inter-
preted in a manner consistent with this intent and 
with the intention of the company that this trust 
satisfy those provision of the internal Revenue Code 
relating to employees' trusts." (R 73) 
ARTICLE VI 
Distribution of Benefits 
"2. (a) if a participant's employment with the com-
pany is terminated, except for retirement or by death 
and except as provided in paragraph 7 of this Article, 
after he has been a full time employee of the company 
for two (2) years or more, he shall have a vested 
interest in the amount then standing to his credit 
equal to ten percent (10%) of such amount plus 
ten percent (10%) of such amount for each full year 
of full time employment in excess of two (2), up to 
a total vested interest in such amount of eighty-
five percent (85%). Within sixty (60) days of 
such termination data he shall be paid the amount 
standing to his credit in one lump sum, or, if the 
Committee elects to pay him such sum in approximately 
equal annual installments over a period of years not 
in excess of ten (10), he shall be paid the first of 
equal annual installments within sixty (60) days of 
such termination data.'1 . . . (R 85) 
FORFEITURE 
"7. If a Participant's status as an employee ceases 
because of his discharge from employment for material 
dishonesty or material violation of, or refusal to 
fellow the instructions of the board of directors of 
the company, the Company shall promptly notify the 
Committee of the discharge of a participant for either 
of these causes and the committee shall then determine 
whether the company had just cause for such discharge. 
Any determination by the committee that the provisions 
of this Article are applicable shall be made within 
ten (10) days after the receipt by the committee of 
notice of discharge, and written notice of such de-
termination shall be given by the committee to the 
employee, addressed by registered mail to his last 
known address. Within twenty (20) days after the 
mailing of such notice, the former employee may appeal 
for arbitration from the determination of the committee, 
as hereafter provided in this Article. Failure to 
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appeal within that time shall constitute an 
irrevocable consent by the former employee to the 
determination of the committee. An appeal shall be 
taken by such employee by filing a written notice 
of appeal for arbitration with the committee, and 
by simultaneously designating one arbitrator from 
among the employees of the company, regardless of 
whether the person so designated is a participant 
under this trust. The second arbitrator shall be 
selected by the Committee, and such arbitrator may 
be an officer, stockholder or employee of the 
Company. The first and second arbitrators shall 
select a third arbitrator. The decision of a 
majority of the arbitrators shall be binding upon 
such former employee, the Committee, the Trustee, 
the Company, and all other parties, and shall be 
enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction. 
Whenever the committee determines that such employee 
has been discharged for cause and the time to appeal 
has expired, or whenever an appeal for arbitration 
is decided adversely to such employee, the amount 
standing to the credit of such participant shall 
be allocated to the other participants in accordance 
with the provisions of Article v. I Whenever the Com-
mittee determines that there was no cause &r the 
discharge of such employee, or whenever an appeal 
for arbitration is decided in favor of such employee, 
the amount standing to the credit t>f such employee 
at the time of his discharge shall be distributed to 
such former employee in accordance with the provisions 
of paragraphs 2 and 5 of this Article." (R 91) 
A review of the provisions relating to forfeiture 
makes it clear that unless the committee acts to declare 
a forfeiture within the time limit (10 days) after 
notification by the company, their right, if any, to 
forfeit the account of a participant expires. 
Whetherthe committee was informed by the company of 
the termination of James Burrows on December 26, 1974, 
as stated by Paul McGill, (Dep. Paul MbGill, P. 5, 
lines 23-25; p. 6, lines 1-5) or at a later date does not 
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matter. The first formal meeting of the committee took 
place on February 21, 1975 and it is undisputed all 
members of the committee knew of the reasons for termina-
tion of the plaintiff by that date. The next formal 
meeting took place on March 7, 1975. 
The official minutes of February 21, 1975 meeting 
are as follows: 
"The Committee determined unanimously that the actions 
were serious enough to warrant the arbitration and 
Mr. McGill stated that there were unanswered questions 
which had to be resolved prior to the distribution 
of any funds... 
Mr. McGill stated that all of the employees in 
question should be contacted so that their side of 
the story could be told and the matter could be 
cleared up immediately and the first distribution 
made.11 (Ex. p. 4 attached to Dep. of paul McGill, 
Transcribed by Harmon) 
The foregoing minutes disclose that even Paul McGill 
was not sure that the alleged acts of James Burrows 
warranted the drastic action of forfeiture of his vested 
account benefits. 
The minutes reflect that the Committee knew it had 
to make a decision as to whether or not a forfeiture 
would be declared. The committee's attorney was present 
and advising the committee. (Ex. p. 4 attached to Dep. 
of paul McGill transcribed by Harmon) 
Rather than pay the vested benefits or declare a 
forfeiture as required by the Plan, the committee did 
neither, but instead invited plaintiff to arbitrate 
the matter. 
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The failure of the administrative committee to 
make a decision and to declare a forfeiture within 
the required ten (10) days, (Article VI P. 7; R 91) 
after notification by the company of the discharge 
of James Burrows, deprived the committee of the right 
to make or declare a forfeiture at some later date, 
in defendants-appellants brief, it is contended 
that a forfeiture was declared and the mere conten-
tion of such a fact raises an issue of fact and pre-
cludes a Summary judgment. 
Defendants-appellants, however, are bound by 
their own documentary evidence and their own testimony 
as contained in the depositions of the only four (4) 
witnesses who would be competent to testify that 
forfeiture was declared. Such evidence and testimony 
demonstrates that no forfeiture was declared within 
ten (10) days or at all. 
The minutes of the Administrative Committee 
(Ex. p. 4 and p. 5 attached to deposition of paul 
McGill transcribed by Harmon), reflect that no for-
feiture was declared on February 21, 1975 or March 
7, 1975. 
The deposition of Richard Klein, one of the 
three members of the Administrative committee, makes 
it clear that even as of the date of the deposition, 
(Jan. 22, 1976), no forfeiture had been declared. 
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"I say the committee didn't determine at that 
time (Feb. 21, 1975) they would not pay the 
benefits. The committee simply determined that 
it would be called in for arbitration. in 
other words, we did not determine he would not 
be paid his benefits." (Dep. Richard K. Klein 
P. 15 Lines 17-2 0) 
The depositions of the other two members of the 
Administrative committee also demonstrate that no 
forfeiture was declared on February 21, 1975; March 
7, 1975; or at any time. 
The deposition of Eugene Fortuna, the company 
Controller, a Trustee of the funds, and the accountant 
for the Plan, demonstrates that as of December 31, 
1975, (almost 12 months later), no forfeiture of the 
vested account benefits of plaintiff had occurred. 
(Dep. of Eugene Fortuna p. 20, lines 6-26; P. 21, 
lines 1-3) plaintiff's vested account benefits were 
still shown as posted to his account on the official 
ledger sheet as of December 31, 1975. (Dep. of 
Eugene Fortuna p. 21, lines 1-3) 
No issue of fact exists concerning whether or 
not the committee forfeited plaintiff's vested ac-
count benefits within the required ten (10) days. 
The minutes of the Administrative Committee, the 
testimony of the three members of the committee and 
the Trustee and accountant for the plan all demon-
strate that no forfeiture was declared at any time, 
let alone within the required ten (10) days. 
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Since no forfeiture was declared within ten (10) 
days after notification of termination by the company 
or at all, the lower court found there was no issue 
of fact and the right of the Administrative committee 
to declare a forfeiture had expired, ithe decision 
of the lower Court stated: 
"That the defendants failed to follow the pro-
visions of the profit Sharing Plan, having 
failed to make a "Determination of Forfeiture" 
as required by the plan and having failed to 
establish the right to forfeit the plaintiff's 
profit Sharing Account, are not entitled to 
retain the funds due plaintiff and the defen-
dants, having failed to determine the funds 
would be paid to plaintiff over a period of time, 
and having failed to follow the provisions of 
the plan are obligated to pay plaintiff the sums 
due plaintiff together with interest accrued 
thereon." (R432) 
The foregoing decision was based tipon the provi-
sions of the plan and the undisputed f£cts. The re-
spondents request that it be upheld and sustained 
by this court. 
POINT II 
JAMES BURROWS WAS AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED TO PAYMENT 
OF HIS VESTED BENEFITS IN ONE LUMP SUM WITHIN SIXTY 
(60) DAYS OF HIS TERMINATION WITH THE COMPANY. 
James Burrows had been an employee of the com-
pany for approximately fifteen (15) years. He had 
become a participant in the plan and had accumulated 
a total gross balance in his account of $25,183.06 
as of December 31, 1974. (R 345) 
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His account had become 85% vested as of December 
31, 1974 and as such James Burrows was entitled to 
vested benefits of $21,405.60 upon his termination 
with the company. (R345) The foregoing facts are 
undisputed and are admitted by defendants-appellants. 
payment of the benefits was automatic under the 
terms of the plan. Article VI "Distribution of 
Benefits'1, paragraph 2 (a) provides the following: 
If a participant's employment with the 
Company is terminated, except for retirement 
or by death and except as provided in paragraph 
7 of this Article, after he has been a full 
time employee of the company for two (2) years 
or more, he shall have a vested interest in the 
amount then standing to his credit equal to 
ten percent (10%) of such amount plus ten per-
cent (10%) of such amount for each full year 
of full time employment in excess of two (2), 
up to a total vested interest in such amount 
of eighty-five (85%) percent* Within sixty 
(60) days of such termination data he shall be 
paid the amount standing to his credit in one 
lump sum, or, if the Committee elects to pay 
him such sum in approximately equal annual 
installments over a period of years not in 
excess of ten (10), he shall be paid the first 
of equal annual installments within sixty (60) 
days of such termination data. (R 85) 
The foregoing provisions of the plan demon-
strate that upon termination of an employee, the 
vested benefits must be paid within sixty (60) days 
unless the committee takes affirmative action to 
defer payment of the benefits over a maximum period 
of ten (10) annual equal yearly installments. 
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The committee took no action to mike a determi-
nation of deferred payment of benefits^ After the 
expiration of sixty (60) days, the right to make a 
determination of deferred payments expired and plain-
tiff became entitled to a lump sum distribution of 
his benefits and the lower Court so fotmd: 
"... the defendants having failed to determine 
the funds would be paid to the plaintiff over 
a period of time... are obligated to pay plain-
tiff the sums due the plaintiff, together with 
interest accrued thereon.11 (R 43£) 
It is admitted by defendants-appellants, that 
the committee did not determine that it would pay 
benefits to plaintiff over an extended or deferred 
period and the foregoing decision of the lower court 
is supported by the provisions of the t>lan and un-
disputed facts. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION WAS BASED UPON 
THE FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
TO FORFEIT THE PLAINTIFF'S VESTED BENEFITS 
DUE UNDER THE PLAN. 
Throughout defendants-appellants brief it con-
tinually refers to alleged "issues" of fact regarding 
the conduct or alleged misconduct of James Burrows 
' s decision 
of fact which 
and continually claims the lower court 
was based upon a resolution of issues ! 
were in dispute. A representative summary of such 
allegations is found at page 10 of defendants-
appellants brief as follows: 
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"The lower Court addressed itself to this 
particular question and found that, as a matter 
of law, the acts of the plaintiff did not con-
stitute material dishonesty or the failure to 
follow the instructions of the Board of Direc-
tors. At pages 477 through 482 of the trans-
cript of the hearing on the Motion for Summary 
judgment, the court discussed a theory that 
the acts of the plaintiff had to relate to his 
employment in order that the right to forfeit 
be invoked and, once again, the court found, 
as a matter of law, these acts did not relate 
to his employment and, therefore, the right 
to forfeit was not established.'1 
These claims and others like them throughout 
the entirety of defendant's-appellant's Brief are 
totally unsupported by the record. 
The lower court's decision makes no reference 
whatsoever to the 'conduct or alleged misconduct of 
james Burrows. 
wl. That the defendants failed to follow 
the provisions of the profit Sharing plan, hav-
ing failed to make a determination of "forfeiture" 
as required by the plan and having failed to 
establish the right to forfeit the plaintiff's 
profit Sharing Account, are not entitled to 
retain the funds due plaintiff and the defen-
dants, having failed to determine the funds 
would be paid to plaintiff over a period of 
time, and having failed to follow the provisions 
of the plan, are obligated to pay plaintiff the 
sums due plaintiff together with interest accrued 
thereon." (R 432) 
The "issues", if any, relating to the conduct 
or alleged misconduct of James Burrows and the inter-
pretation of the meaning of "material dishonesty" 
were not decided by the lower Court. The lower court 
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found that no forfeiture was declared by the plan 
Committee and therefore the determination of other 
"issues" became unnecessary. 
Although the lower court explored the other 
"issues" thoroughly during oral argument, it did 
not base its decision upon them. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT RAISE ANY ISSUES 
OF FACT AT THE TRIAL LEVEL. 
The question of whether or not the conduct 
or alleged misconduct of James Burrows constituted 
material dishonesty was not decided b^ the lower 
Court and is not before this Court now. 
The defendants-appellants claim that by merely 
contending an issue of fact exists, tHeir contention 
alone precludes a Summary judgment. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of citfil procedure 
requires that after a Motion for Summ4ry judgment 
is filed, the defending party may not rely upon 
mere contentions or allegations alone to raise a 
genuine issue for trial. Rule 56 (e) provides as 
follows: 
"When a Motion for Summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this Rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response by Affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this Rule, must set forth speci-
fic facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. if he does not so respond, 
Summary judgment, if appropriate^, shall be 
entered against him." 
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The case of Reliable Furniture vs. Fidelity 
Guaranty insurance Underwriters, inc. 16 Utah 2nd 
211, 398 P2nd 685 (1965) does not nullify Rule 56 
(e) as contended by defendants-appellants in their 
brief. The Reliable Furniture case involved a 
dismissal of an action by the trial court at a 
pre-Trial conference even though no motions for 
Summary judgment or supporting Affidavits had 
been filed. This Court in the Reliable Furniture 
Company case stated the following: 
"It is appropriate to reiterate that the dis-
missal of an action at pre-Trial, which 
peremptorily turns a party out of court, is 
a drastic action which should be used sparing-
ly and with great caution. This is especi-
ally true where the dismissal is ordered 
without any Motion for Summary judgment being 
filed to put the party on notice of such con-
templated action and afford him an opportunity 
to meet it.11 (Emphasis added) 
The Reliable Furniture company case is not 
applicable to the case at hand. in the case at 
hand a Motion for Summary judgment and an exten-
sive memorandum was filed and served upon the 
opposing party. The opposing party (defendants-
appellants) had ample time and did respond to the 
Motion for Summary judgment. 
prior to the time that plaintiff filed its 
Motion for Summary judgment, plaintiff took the 
depositions of all of the defendants and every 
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witness known to be competent to testify on the 
issues raised in the pleadings. in addition, ex-
tensive interrogatories were served upon the defen-
dants. 
plaintiff then filed a Motion for Summary 
judgment and prepared a fifty (50) page memorandum 
(R 352-401) in support of its Motion for Summary 
judgment. The memorandum extracted applicable 
portions of the nine (9) depositions and the 
answers to interrogatories submitted by the 
defendants. 
The defendants-appellants responded to the 
memorandum but did not cite any portibns of the 
depositions or interrogatories to support a claim 
that an issue of fact existed. A review of defen-
dants' memorandum (R 422-430) further discloses 
that no Affidavits were filed to raise any issue 
of fact. 
The defendants are bound by their Answers to 
interrogatories and their depositions. The wit-
nesses who were deposed were subjected to exami-
nation by both sides and their testimony appears 
to be clear and unambiguous. 
Defendants-appellants contend that issues of 
fact exist but they did not cite any record to 
substantiate their claim at the trial court level. 
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POINT V 
THE CLAIM MADE BY DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS THAT 
THE CONDUCT OF JAMES BURROWS WASN'T AUTHORIZED 
BY PAUL MCGILL DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A PRE-
SUMPTION THAT THE CONDUCT OF JAMES BURROWS 
WAS IMPROPER OR MATERIALLY DISHONEST. 
The question of whether or not the conduct 
or alleged misconduct of James Burrows constituted 
"material dishonesty" was not decided by the lower 
Court. Because that "issue" was not decided by 
the lower court it is not before this Court now. 
However, since defendantsf-appellants' brief 
directs so much attention to the word "unauthorized" 
plaintiff will briefly comment on the defendants1 
use of the word "unauthorized." 
Defendants-appellants use the word "unautho-
rized" as though it were synonomous with the phrase 
"improper" or "materially dishonest" when in fact 
such is not the case. 
REMOVAL OF MATERIALS 
james Burrows, with the permission of the 
various sub-contractors, removed scrap and surplus 
bricks, scrap lumber and a power pole from the 
construction site. All of the competent witnesses 
to the foregoing events have been deposed. There 
is no evidence or record that will support a 
contention that james Burrows did not have the 
permission of the foregoing to remove the said 
construction debris. 
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Defendants-appellants merely contend that Paul 
McGill did not "authorize"the removal of the materials, 
The record does not contain any evidence that prior 
to the removal of the materials Paul McGill or any-
one ever told james Burrows or anyone they could 
not remove such scrap materials, in fact, the 
record shows that it was common practice in the 
construction industry for site personnel to remove 
such scrap materials. (See Dep. of F|.oyd Young) 
After the events occurred, paul McGill told james 
Burrows such conduct was not "authorized" by him. 
MILEAGE 
Defendants-appellants do not deny that james 
Burrows incurred mileage on company business and 
that he submitted claims to the company for re-
imbursement and was paid by them. They merely 
assert that paul McGill did not "authorize" the 
mileage reimbursement. They claim an issue now 
exists as to whether such conduct constituted 
"material dishonesty." 
OVERTIME 
james Burrows was working as an inspector on 
a Federal project, the M P 0 (Main post Office). 
His duties were to inspect the construction of 
the building. He was also directed to plot curves 
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and graphs. He stayed on site during working 
hours inspecting the building. After working 
hours, he plotted the curves and graphs. 
Defendants-appellants do not contend that 
james Burrows did not work the overtime or that 
it was not worked while performing company business. 
They do not contend that time card claims were 
not submitted to appropriate office personnel and 
paid by them. They merely contend that the over-
time was not previously "authorized" by Paul McGill. 
They contend this raises an issue of whether or 
not the conduct of james Burrows was "materially 
dishonest." Pt might be noted parenthetically 
that Federal Law requires payment of the overtime 
hours worked whether paul McGill "authorized" the 
payment or not. Neither the record nor the testi-
mony of paul McGill established that james Burrows 
was told not to work overtime until after the 
overtime was incurred. 
POINT VI 
THE COURTS HAVE UNIFORMLY HELD THAT A 
PROFIT SHARING AND RETIREMENT PLAN IS A 
CONTRACTUALLY BINDING DOCUMENT BETWEEN 
PARTIES AND THE FORFEITURE CLAUSES CON-
TAINED THEREIN ARE TO BE CONSTRUED 
LIBERALLY AND IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYEE. 
Although the language of most profit Sharing 
plans indicate that a trust is created, the courts 
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have held that such an arrangement creates a 
binding contract between the employee and the 
administrative committee of the plan. 
in the case of Russell vs. Princeton Labora-
tories, inc., 321 A 2d 800 N. J. (1967), the 
Court stated in regards to the profit Sharing 
Plan that: 
"When an employee renders service in re-
sponse to the promise of the trust plan, 
he acquires a right no less contractual 
than if the plan were expressly bargained 
for." 
in the case of voight vs. South Side Laundry 
& Dry Cleaners, inc., 128 N- W. 2d 411 Wis. (1964), 
the court stated: 
"Non-contributory pension plans are held to 
give rise to a contractual obligation by 
the employer to pay pension benefits to 
the employees entitled thereto under the 
plan communicated to the employees where 
the employees thereafter remain in the 
employer's employment and render service 
for the requisite period. Cantor v. Berk-
shire Life ins. Co. (1960), 171 Ohio St. 
405, 171 N. E. 2d 518; Ball v. victor 
Adding Machine Co. (5th Cir 1956), 236 
F. 2d 170; Siegel v. First Pennsylvania 
Banking & Trust Co. (D.C Pa., 1961, 201 
F. Supp. 664; Anno. 42 A.L.R. 2d 461, 467. 
The same principle is applicable to profit 
sharing plans. Zwolanck v. Baker Mfg. Co. 
(1912), 150 Wis. 517, 137 N.W. 769. 
(Emphasis added) 
In the case of Levitt v. Billy penn corpora-
tion, 283 A 2d 873 pa. (1971), the Court stated: 
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"The employee has a contractual right to 
enforce the plan according to its terms and 
such benefits may not be denied arbitrarily 
even where the words such as "absolute dis-
cretion" are used, such terms do not give 
the administrative body unfettered discre-
tion, it is necessary to look at the plan 
itself to define the limit of the Trustee's 
power." 
The Courts have also adopted the same rules 
of construction in relation to Plans. in Russell 
v. Princeton Laboratories, Inc., previously cited 
above, the Court stated: 
"These plans are to be liberally construed 
in favor of the employee." 
in Levitt v. Billy Penn Corporation, also 
previously cited above, the Court stated: 
"The question then is whether the employee 
should suffer a forfeiture of something he 
has earned. Forfeiture being disfavored 
we should take any tenable view to avoid 
it. indeed these plans are to be liber-
ally construed in favor of the employee." 
in the case of Fretzsche v. First Western 
Bank & Trust Company, 336 p. 2d 589 cal. (1959) 
the court stated in regard to a pension plan: 
"pension plans are to be liberally construed 
in favor of the employee. Klench v. Board 
of pension Fund commissioners, 1926, 79 
Cal. App. 171, 186, 249 p. 46. 
The general rule is that pension plans, 
formulated by an employer, are construed 
most strongly against the employer, 
Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1937, 
57 Ohio App. 4, 11 N.E. 2d 878, 879. 
in Food Fairs Stores, inc., vs. Greeley, 
264 Md. 105, 285 A 2d 632, (1972), the Court 
stated: 
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"Forfeiture clauses should be strictly and 
narrowly construed - the forfeiture of the 
right of work is to be avoided whenever the 
Court can discern a rational basis for that 
result." 
The Court also stated: 
flEven though the employer has a legitimate 
interest in the protection of its cliental, 
the restrictive covenant will not be enforced 
if under all the circumstances the covenant is 
unduly restrictive of the employee's freedom. 
The right to labor or to use one's skill/ 
talents or experience for one's own benefit 
or furnish them to another for compensation 
is a natural and inherent right of tfie 
individual." 
POINT VII 
DEFENDANT'S COUNTER-CLAIM IS BASED UPON A 
BY-LAW OF THE CORPORATION WHICH IS EXPRESSLY 
PROHIBITED BY PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CODE, 
THE CORPORATE CHARTER AND IS VOID AS BEING 
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 
Plaintiff worked for Steel contractors during 
the summer of 1974 for 2 or 3 weeks on Weekends 
and in the evening. He received approximately 
$400.00 - $600.00. in addition, plaintiff per-
formed detailing work in 1972, one or tWo nights 
a week for several months. This work yas per-
formed for pedco Detailing who paid th^ plaintiff 
approximately $350.00 - $400.00. 
Defendant alleges this conduct which occurred 
two years prior to the termination of plaintiff 
justifies the forfeiture of the profit Sharing 
Account. 
Defendant's Counter-claim alleges :| 
"1. That plaintiff was a stockholder of the 
defendant corporation. 
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2. That the By-Laws of the corporation 
obligate the stockholders to the corporation 
and become a contractually binding obliga-
tion upon the stockholders merely because of 
the acquisition of stock of the corporation 
by the stockholder. 
3. That No. 6 of the By-Laws of p M Engineers, 
inc., duly adopted by said Corporation on 
the 15th day of September, 1976, states as 
follows: 
fAll stockholders agree that any remunera-
tion to them by an outside firm or individual 
for work performed of a nature engaged in 
by the corporation are monies or value due 
and payable to the corporation. in other 
words, stockholder may not engage in out-
side engineering or related services as an 
individual, nor may one or more stockholders 
enter into a business which provides such 
services and is intended to generate indi-
vidual profit. This paragraph illustrates 
the intent and reason for the birth of this 
Corporation, to-wit: A welding together of 
individual abilities of the stockholders 
as a team for the mutual benefit of the 
Corporation and themselves. Furthermore, 
it is the intent and wish that each stock-
holder receive monetary benefit in direct 
proportion to his output, both efficiency 
wise and workwise. Therefore, in conse-
quence, there will be no reason for outside 
work on the part of the stockholders and 
a high incentive remaining.' 
4. That said By-Law constitutes a contract 
as between plaintiff and defendant, p M 
Engineers, inc. 
6. That while an employee and shareholder 
of p M Engineers, inc., in violation of 
said By-Laws, plaintiff james M. Burrows 
did work for outside individuals or firms, 
including Steel contractors, inc. and pedco 
Detailing Service. Said work performed was 
of a similar nature to that engaged in by 
Defendant, p M Engineers, inc., and was 
performed for a potential client of p M 
Engineers, inc. 
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7. That said acts constitute a breach of 
said contract and plaintiff is liable to 
P M Engineers, inc. in the amount of any 
remuneration received for services rendered 
to said outside firms or individuals; that 
Plaintiff should account for all sums re-
ceived while working for said outside firms 
or individuals, 
8. That the acts and conduct oi the plain-
tiff, james M. Burrows, were willful and 
malicious and that by reason of said conduct 
the Defendant is entitled to punitive damages 
and attorney's fees in this matter; and that 
a reasonable sum to allow the Defendant is 
that of $20,000.00. " 
The By-Law referred to in defendants' counter-
claim is worded in such a way as to appear to 
require a stockholder to pay money to the corpora-
tion or to be liable to the corporation for an 
amount in excess of the purchase pricpe of the 
stock. 
The Articles of incorporation of P M Engineers 
expressly prohibit such a By-Law. The Articles of 
incorporation contain the following statements: 
"ARTICLE XIV 
The private property of th<b stockholder 
shall not be liable for the debts and 
obligations of the corporation. 
... 
ARTICLE XVI 
The stock of this corporation shall be 
non-assessable. 
ARTICLE XIX 
The Board of Directors may adopt By-
Laws not inconsistent with these 
Articles and with law of the State 
of Utah and the united Stages of 
America and may repeal and amend the 
same from time to time.11 
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As the above Articles of incorporation indi-
cate, the By-Laws shall not be inconsistent with 
the Laws of the State of Utah. The Utah code 
Annotated, Section 16-10-4 (1) 1953, allows a 
corporation: 
"... to make and alter By-Laws, not incon-
sistent with its Articles of incorporation 
or with the laws of this State, for the 
administration and regulation of the 
affairs of the corporation." 
The Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-23, 
1953, entitled, Liability of Subscribers and 
Shareholders states: 
,fA holder or a subscriber to shares of a 
corporation shall be under no obligation to 
the corporation or its creditors with re-
spect to such shares other than the obliga-
tion to pay to the corporation the full 
consideration for which such shares were 
issued or to be issued...11 (Emphasis added) 
The statute clearly provides that the only 
obligation owed by a stockholder to a corporation 
is to pay for the shares of stock issued to him. 
The Utah Code Annotated, Section 34-34-2, de-
fines the public policy of Utah in relation to 
contracts which restrict employment as follows: 
"It is hereby declared to be the public 
policy of the State of Utah that the right 
of persons to work, whether in private employ-
ment or for the state, its counties, cities, 
school districts, or other political sub-
division, shall not be denied or abridged 
on account of membership or non-membership 
in any labor union, labor organization or 
any other type of association; and further, 
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That the right to live includes the right 
to work. The exercise of the right to work 
must be protected and maintained free from 
undue restraints and coercion." (Emphasis 
added) 
It is therefore clear that a merfe re-
striction on employment is against the public 
policy of the State of Utah. 
Not only does the By-Law purport to restrict 
employment, but also it purports to m^ke a stock-
holder liable to the corporation. 
The defendant company had the stockholders 
sign a Buy-Sell Agreement/ but the Buy-Sell Agree-
ment makes no mention of any such "obligation'1 as is 
contained in By-Law number six. See Exhibits 2 and 
3 attached to the Amended interrogatories of defendant. 
(Ex. p-2 attached to Deposition of palul McGill) 
A careful reading of the By-Law makes it quite 
clear that the By-Law was adopted by the incorporators 
of the defendant company and that eadh incorporator was 
to receive remuneration based upon his stock ownership 
and work output. 
Since it is clear that: (1) Plaintiff was not 
an incorporator of the defendant company and; (2) 
Plaintiff was paid on an hourly basi^; this By-Law 
was never intended to be applied to plaintiff. 
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Since the defendant paid the plaintiff on an 
hourly basis, it is clear that the defendant company 
breached its own supposed contract and therefore waived 
any right to claim that the alleged contract binds plain-
tiff. 
Not one case cited in defendants-appellants brief 
to support its Counter-claim applies to the fact 
situation of the case at hand. No case cited re-
quires a stockholder to pay money to the corporation 
because a By-Law prohibits the stockholder from working 
for other companies without paying his earnings to the 
corporation in which he owns stock. 
CONCLUSION 
1. plaintiff was automatically entitled to 
his vested benefits due under the plan unless 
defendants-appellants acted to forfeit those benefits 
in the manner and the time prescribed by the plan. 
The defendants- appellants did not forfeit the benefits 
within ten (10) days as required or at all and the 
right if any to forfeit the benefits expired. 
2. plaintiff was automatically entitled to a 
lump sum distribution of his benefits within sixty 
(60) days of termination unless within that time the 
plan committee acted to defer payments. Admittedly 
the committee took no such action and plaintiff is 
entitled to a lump sum distribution. 
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'3. The lower Court's decision was based upon 
failure of the defendants-appellants to act to 
forfeit the benefits due plaintiff - - not upon 
a resolution of supposed "issues11 of fact. 
4. Defendants-appellants did not raise any 
"issues" of fact at the trial level and cannot 
now claim that such issues exist. 
5. Defendants-appellants characterization of 
the word "unauthorized" is inappropriate. The 
record does not support a claim that the supposed 
"unauthroized" acts were also "materially dis-
honest . " 
6. pension and profit Sharing Plans should 
be liberally construed to benefit the employee. 
7. The counter-claim of defendant p-M Engineers 
against plaintiff is wholly without merit and is 
based upon a By-Law which is expressly prohibited 
by the Utah Code, the corporate charter itself and public policy 
8. The decision by the lower court is amply 
supported by the record, is just and equitable and 
should be sustained and upheld. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
SCHOENHALS & FAUST 
jack L- Schoenhals 
james H. Faust 
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